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The copious literature on love in early India has most recently been
interpreted as a variant of the universal experience of human sexual-
ity. Studies have rooted the uniqueness of Indian ideas either in theolo-
gical conceptions of the immanent and transcendent, or in the particu-
larity of the parent–child relation in India.1 Whatever the insights of
such scholarship, twomajor problems relevant to this essay are its posi-
tioning of a ‘civilizational’ backdrop as its subject of analysis—either
‘India’ or ‘Hinduism’—and, particularly with the former approach, the
subsequent application of what has been called the ‘repressive hypo-
thesis’ to the Indian material, which poses the ‘transcendent’ prin-
ciples of Indian civilization in a restraining role over those deemed life-
afﬁrming or immanent. This essay will offer an alternative to these
interpretations by placing conceptions of romantic love in medieval
India within their social and discursive contexts, and connect up the
discourses on self-discipline in medieval India with those of love in a
more historically speciﬁc and illuminating way.
Whatever the claims of nationalist or humanist scholars, contex-
tualization is manifestly relevant in the case of romantic love for the
simple fact that the sources quite conspicuously fail to posit a universal
1 For the former, see Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, S´iva: The Erotic Ascetic (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), and Lee Siegel, Fires of Love, Waters of Peace:
Passion and Renunciation in Indian Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1983). These scholars have argued, using the paradigm of J. C. Heesterman, that
Hindu thought may be best characterized by the tension between the immanent
world and the drive for the transcendent, abandon for the senses and abandonment
of the senses. David Shulman has applied the following model to Indian kingship,
arguing that the king’s personality reveals this larger civilizational conﬂict; David
Shulman, The King and the Clown in South Indian Mythology (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985). More recently, he has used this argument within an ‘histor-
ical’ frame to discuss the sexuality of Na¯yaka kings in late-medieval south India
in Velcheru Narayana Rao, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Symbols of
Substance: Court and State in Nayaka Period Tamilnadu (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1992). For the latter interpretation, see Sudhir Kakar and John Munder Ross, Tales
of Love, Sex and Danger (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
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subject for their discourses. In fact, they say quite explicitly that those
ﬁt to enjoy erotic love were to have four qualiﬁcations which distingu-
ished them from other members of society: good birth, wealth, urban-
ity, and beauty.2 Romantic love, as revealed by the evidence we have
available to us from early medieval India, was a speciﬁcally hierarch-
ical and class-deﬁned institution. Its most immediate context was typ-
ically the royal court or the associations of reﬁned and noble city-living
men who were drawn to the court for their livelihoods. Judging from
its prevalence in Sanskrit literature, we may also say that the institu-
tion of romantic love in India grew up with the evolution of a particular
type of class society. Its terminology is covalent with broader concep-
tions of afﬁliation in that society, and some of its key dynamics reﬂect
the preoccupations of that society. Its rise and prominence may be
effectively traced through the proliferation and development of San-
skrit ornate poetry, or ka¯vya, at royal courts from the second century
AD, but particularly from the fourth–ﬁfth centuries.
The evolution of ka¯vya in both form and content exhibits an
increasing complexity in manners and conventions among the courtly
elite from Gupta times. This was as much the case with love as it
was with elements of personal comportment, social disposition and
ethical self-fashioning. If we compare the story cycle of the courtship
of Nala and Damayantı¯ as it appears in the Maha¯bha¯rata, dated per-
haps to the ﬁrst centuries of the Christian era, with the Nais.adhı¯yacar-
itam of S´rı¯hars.a, composed during the reign of the Ga¯had. va¯la king
Jayacandra of Kanauj (1170-1193), it is immediately apparent that
romantic love had become a far more discursively elaborate process,
one imbricated with the concerns of personal reﬁnement and ‘orna-
mented’ with various embellishments which characterized the wider
preoccupations of courtly life. The development of the ‘form’ and
genre which separates these two cycles is itself an index of the evolu-
tion of a tradition of courtly love in medieval India. Erotic love
emerged as one of the chief preoccupations of ka¯vya, so much so that
by the time of Bhoja (eleventh century) it was deemed to be the
most eminent of all aesthetic sentiments.
Courtly poetry, however, must be put in the context of other types
of sources. This essay will also draw from the s´a¯stric literature
regarding dharma, artha (acquisition) and ka¯ma (pleasure). Particu-
2 See Va¯tsya¯yana, Ka¯masu¯tra, ed. Goswami Damodar Shastri (Benares: Jaikrishn-
adas and Haridas Gupta, 1929), 1.4.1–2; compare with the later Kavis´ekhara Jyotis´-
vara, Pan˜casa¯yaka, ed. Dhundhira¯ja S´a¯stri (Benares: Jaikrishnadas and Haridas
Gupta, 1939), 1.4.
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larly relevant are the texts on ka¯ma—most notably Va¯tsya¯yana’s Ka¯m-
asu¯tra (c. third to ﬁfth centuries AD), which often contain, among
other relevant topics, sections devoted entirely to the characteristics
and relations of lovers, and perhaps even more important for the
interpretations which follow, are the treatises on artha and nı¯ti
(policy) which together roughly correspond to the domain of polity.
Taken together, these prescriptive knowledges had as their audience
the congeries of men and assemblages of lords who formed the ruling
e´lite of Indian courts. Also important are Sanskrit inscriptions, usu-
ally royal orders (s´a¯sana) which mention in their preambles particular
conceptions of the relations between agents at court. Finally, the
gnomic and didactic sayings, aphorisms, or single-stanza poems often
generically referred to as subha¯s.ita (literally ‘well-spoken’, sayings or
counsels which circulated orally among the circles of the e´lite and
which echo through the breadth and interstices of Sanskrit
literature), give us a fascinating insight into the mental structures
of the ruling classes of medieval India. Read together, these sources
illuminate the preoccupation of erotic love in a different way.
Understanding the discursive provenance of the terms which come
to refer to romantic love in medieval India is particularly difﬁcult
because their inter-relation shifts between aesthetic and religious
traditions, and over time. Nevertheless, reading the early texts, one
can distinguish between two different types of words: those which
refer to the physical desire for and pleasure arising from sexual
union, terms like ka¯ma and rati; and those terms which refer to the
more general dispositions of adoration, attachment, affection, and
participation that lovers were to share in varying degrees with one
another, typically designated by terms like ra¯ga, anura¯ga, s´r.n
. ga¯ra and
bhakti. In drawing this distinction, I am not suggesting that these
terms functioned to distinguish between physical sex and a higher
form of love. Both sorts of terms must be distinguished from sexual
union itself (sambhoga, surata) and were uniformly deemed to arise
within the mind/heart of the lover. Some schools of theology cer-
tainly did counterpose some of these terms against one another, like
Kr.s.n. a in the Gı¯ta¯ who recommends bhakti over ka¯ma. But in the case
of the relations between lovers as described in the Ka¯masu¯tra, Na¯t. yas´a¯-
stra, and other texts of ka¯vya tradition, these two types of terms are
seen as related and complementary, rather than opposed. Moreover,
the admonitions to avoid too much ka¯ma, which formed as much part
of the Ka¯masu¯tra tradition as it did that of the ‘religious’ sphere,
apply equally to the terms of bhakti and anura¯ga. These latter terms
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could encompass or include ka¯ma within themselves. This does not
mean, however, that these two sets of terms were identical. The
latter set of terms, particularly those of bhakti and anura¯ga, were used
more generally to characterize relations between various men in
medieval Indian society. The rise of these terms in political dis-
courses parallels precisely the rise of ka¯vya as a discursive form and
love as a courtly theme. And it is through attention to the wider
usages of these terms that we may learn something of the preponder-
ance of erotic themes among the ruling discourses of medieval India.
This essaywill not assume thatmodes of self-discipline in early India
should be seen as repressive forces restraining innate passions and
desires.Modern scholars have too often understoodmastery and pleas-
ure as autonomous and conceptually opposed domains. Their interac-
tion has been interpreted as the more or less successful impingement
of the repressive forces, usually in the form of transcendentalizing
brahmanical orthodoxy on the ‘erotic’ drive of the popular or Pura¯n. ic.
Much work remains to be done in the Indian context even from this
vantage point. In European sociology, Norbert Elias has been instru-
mental in suggesting that development of mechanisms of restraint—
or ‘civilizing processes’—such as manners and courtesy have reﬂected
social compulsions. In the Indian context, the history of erotic love thus
could be connected to the growth of courtly manners within a frame-
work akin to the now obsolete paradigm of ‘Sanskritization’.
In European sociology, the alternative to this tradition of scholar-
ship has been most expressly articulated by Michel Foucault. This
‘repressive hypothesis’, as Foucault has argued, is a distorted self-
perception of modern bourgeois societies. Disciplinary mechanisms
have been far more productive of desire than either their architects
or opponents have assumed. Foucault has read disciplinary practices
in pre-bourgeois societies as part of regimes of self-discipline con-
nected with the formation of ethical subjecthood and agency. This
essay will read the ‘repressive traces’ in courtly texts not as vestiges
of a network of codes negating pleasure, but as disciplines integral
to the production of desire. While there is certainly an antagonistic
relation between self-mastery and sensual pleasure in the courtly
texts, the effects of this relation were not always negative in relation
to the pursuit of pleasure. While for the ascetical life the conquest
of the senses involved a subdual, or sublimation of pleasure, in the
courtly contexts this same conquest entailed a cultivation of desire.
The enjoyment of pleasures was thus not understood as a straightfor-
ward release of libidinal impulse, as is clear from Va¯tsya¯yana’s elo-
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quent argument in the Ka¯masu¯tra that ka¯ma required the application
of ‘means’ (upa¯ya).3 These means, the ‘rules of engagement’ that the
erotic texts lay out in great detail, both through speciﬁc conventions
and general principles, were quite explicitly understood as a form of
self-mastery. The desires of the courtly texts, thus, are encouraged
and formed positively and internally by the call to self-mastery. In fact,
according to the texts, the proper exercise of pleasure was a form of
self-mastery. Self-mastery did not bear down upon desire, but instead
cultivated and operationalized it.
A short example from the Nala story will adumbrate the theme I
wish to develop here. In the Maha¯bha¯rata’s account of the initial love-
sickness of Nala and Damayantı¯, we ﬁnd the following description of
Nala: ‘unable to bear his desire in his heart, Nala at once left secretly
and sat in a grove besides the women’s quarters.’4 In S´rı¯hars.a’s rendi-
tion, this event is preceded by a rather long conceit about the godKa¯m-
adeva’s attempt to subdue Nala through the form of Damayantı¯—a
conceit which is signiﬁcant in itself as we shall see—in which Damay-
antı¯’s excellence is said to be ‘made by the king the guest of his ears’.
After Damayantı¯ enters Nala’s heart, S´rı¯hars.a says that the
powerful Nala, though consumed by desire, did not ask the king of Vidarbha
for the hand of his daughter, as the proud would rather renounce both life
and happiness than forsake the single vow never to beg. Feigning to be
depressed on account of something, he concealed the succession of his sighs
caused by his separation from her, and denied his paleness by attributing
it to an excess of camphor in the sandal paste applied to his body. Luckily,
even while in company, he was able to conceal during the vı¯n. a¯ music both
his words uttered to his beloved under delusion, as well as the fact that he
fainted. The king, who had a reputation of being the foremost among those
whose senses were conquered, was ashamed when the irresistible power
of Ka¯madeva became, by degrees, manifest in him. Neither the power of
discrimination nor other virtues could restrain Nala’s disquiet; for where
there is desire, Ka¯madeva produces an unrest that is never restrained—
such are the ways of the world. When, in spite of his efforts, he became
unable to sit in the royal assembly even for a moment, without betraying
signs of being in love he desired to retreat to a secluded place under the
pretext of recreation in his pleasure garden.5
While both accounts precede Nala’s entrance into the garden, where
in the Nais.adhı¯yacaritam his problems worsen as a host of ﬂowers
3 Ka¯masu¯tra 1.2.18–24.
4 Maha¯bha¯rata, ed. V. S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belvalkar (Poona: Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, 1961–), 3.50.17–18.
5 Nais.adhı¯yacaritam, ed. Narayana Rama Acharya (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press,
1952), 1.49–55.
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afﬂict his mind and make him pine even more, S´rı¯hars.a’s elaboration
is signiﬁcant. He dwells on the afﬂictive condition of Nala’s growing
affection for Damayantı¯, whether as the designs of Cupid or simply
as an indication of his ‘weakness’ at court. How should we under-
stand the elaboration of distress and ‘shame’ (sa¯patrapata¯) at the
manifestation of his condition, and his efforts to conceal his feelings
before members of the court? Should we see this elaboration as the
result of increased imposition on the part of brahmanical orthodoxy
upon the desires of the poem’s hero? The approach here will instead
see the elaboration of romantic love not merely as part of the
‘restraining’ compulsions of the social but also as part of the product-
ive agency that such compulsions encouraged.
The Self and its Discipline
We may begin with the conception of the self in early medieval India.
While courtly theories of the self are related to and draw from those
formulated by monastic and liturgical orders of post-Vedic India, it
would seem that the worldly life of the court presented its own set
of exigencies and problems which demanded particular strategies
and solutions. This was so much the case that the care and discipline
of the self was foundational for all of the ‘scientiﬁc’ knowledges
which were to organize human life, and particularly (for our
purposes) that of nı¯ti, or ‘policy’. The problems taken up in these
texts were ‘ethical’ to the extent that they sought to formulate the
postures and dispositions that a man was to take with those around
him. This ethical training, according to the texts on polity, was to
begin with an active relationship toward oneself. The basic idea of
the self we ﬁnd mentioned in the courtly texts and manuals on polit-
ical conduct was a concentrically arranged structure which may be
represented visually, following Ka¯mandakı¯’s Nı¯tisa¯ra, in Figure 1.6
The central constituent of the self, which could stand in for the self
as a whole, was the soul, or a¯tman. In Ka¯mandakı¯, the next element
was the mind, or manas, but other formulations include entities like
buddhi, cit, aham. ka¯ra, collectively known as the ‘internal organs’
(antah.karan. as).7 The outermost constituents of the self were the ﬁve
6 Ka¯mandakı¯, Nı¯tisa¯ra, ed. and trans. Raja Rajendralal Mitra (Calcutta: Asiatic
Society, 1869), 1.33–6.
7 Ka¯mandakı¯ is aware of this elision. He states elsewhere that ‘perfect knowledge
(vijn˜a¯na), the heart (hr.daya), consciousness (citta), the mind (manas) and the intellect
(buddhi) are synonymous and are caused by the a¯tman to discriminate between what
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Figure 1.
sensory-organs or indriyas—ear, skin, eyes, tongue and nose—along
with ﬁve other ‘external’ organs—the sex organ, the anus, hands,
feet, and mouth, which together formed the ten faculties of action
and cognition. Taken together, the constituents of the self formed a
particular order which may be grasped in a number of ways. The
spatial arrangement was concentric, and operated with a logic very
similar to that of the court or the kingdom. The self’s most import-
ant and deﬁning element, the a¯tman, stood at the centre of the struc-
ture as its permanent core. It was comparatively inactive, preferring
instead to act through the agency of less permanent sheaths which
surrounded it in successive layers. Consequently, the outer layers
of the self surrounding the a¯tman were considered to be karan. as—
‘instruments’ or ‘means’ of knowledge and action, ultimately in the
service of their master, the a¯tman. The karan.as were further divided
into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ instruments or organs (antah.karan. a,
ba¯hirkaran. a). Each of these organs had an activity (kriya¯) appropriate
to it, according to Ka¯mandakı¯. The most important of these were
the sensory organs (indriyas) which had as their activities sound,
tough, vision, taste and smell, while the other external organs per-
formed speech, movement, the giving and accepting of objects, and
excretion. The major activity of the sensory organs was of course
to engage with their appropriate ﬁelds (vis.aya). The more complex
should be done and what should not be done’, Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.30. Elsewhere Ka¯mandaki
includes the a¯tman along with the manas among of the antah.karan. as, Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.35.
This would seem atypical. He implies in 1.30 that the a¯tman has a more determinat-
ive role. For different formulations of the antah. karan. as, see John Grimes, A Concise
Dictionary of Indian Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), s.v.
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processes of the internal elements of the self presupposed the activit-
ies of the sensory organs. In a process called sam. kalpa, the mind
organized indeterminate sensory data into determinate perceptual
forms. From this process a series of both affective and volitional
states arose like doubt, imagination, and pleasure and desire. In this
structure, the mind was crucially situated: it formed the link between
the outer sense organs and the more internal parts of the self. It was
the ﬁrst element of sentience in perception.
Relations between elements of the self were not simply based on
function, but they also implied hierarchy andmastery.One of the earli-
est images of the self was that of a chariot. Each of the self ’s compon-
ents was analogized to a part of the chariot as driven by its master, the
a¯tman. In an eighth-century inscription of the Ra¯s.t.raku¯t.a king
Amoghavars.a, the soul is compared to the king, the mind his minister,
the group of senses his circle of feudatories, and speech and the other
organs to servants conforming to the prescribed rules of dharma.8 This
is repeated by spiritual discourses as well. A thirteenth-century S´aiva
Siddha¯ntan text, the Civajn˜a¯napo¯tam, contains a similar description of
the soul ruling over the inner organs of manas, cit, buddhi, aham. ka¯ra just
as a king rules his kingdom through his ministers.9 Such metaphors
not only underscore the evolution of political structures and the
importance of the social relations of the court in imagining the insides
of people, but just as importantly, reveal something about the actual
relation that the twice-bornman was to have with himself. The normal
and proper ‘functioning’ of the self was one that implied relations of
internal hierarchy, mastery, and even coercion. The mind’s activity of
resolving indeterminate sensory matter received from the indriyas into
coherence (sam. kalpa) was not simply a generic psychic process, but a
marshalling and discipline of the senses as instruments in the same
manner as aminister bearing the burden of rule effected the will of his
master in regard to his feudatories. The mind was ruler of all of the
external organs through which a person communicated with and com-
manded the objects of the senses, whichwere regarded as its ‘domains’,
or ﬁelds (vis.aya) of mastery.
So it is that we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst dictum of nı¯ti or policy in the theor-
etical texts is that the king should master the various elements of his
own self, particularly his senses. Mastery or ‘conquering’ of the senses
8 Epigraphia Indica 18 (1925–26), no. 26, p. 255.
9 Meykanda Deva, Civajn˜a¯napo¯tam trans. Nallaswam: Pillai (Dharmapuram: Gnana-
sambandam Press, 1945), 4.
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(indriyajaya) was of utmost importance for the king. The texts on polity
are emphatic on this point. According to Ka¯mandakı¯, the conquest of
the senses made a candidate ﬁt for the knowledge of the s´a¯stra, as only
one who had mastered his senses was ﬁt to receive its meaning.10 This
mastery of the senses was effected through and synonymous with self-
discipline or vinaya.11 The term vinaya, one of the most generic virtues
of courtly life, was conceptually (and etymologically) related to con-
cepts of proper ‘policy’ (nı¯ti) and proper ‘directed conduct’ (naya)
integral to life at court. While naya and nı¯ti generally referred to con-
duct in relation to the external world, vinayamost often denoted con-
duct towards oneself. The position of the texts is that an individual’s
conduct and policy at court presupposed and sprang from ‘self-policy’
or self-discipline. As Ka¯mandakı¯ puts it, ‘self-discipline (vinaya) is the
root (mu¯lam) of directed conduct (naya)’.12 This is because, according
to Ka¯mandakı¯, perfect knowledge of the s´a¯stra could only be obtained
through discipline.13 For Kaut.ilya, self-discipline in the various know-
ledges is the cause of mastery over the senses, which is in turn consid-
ered the essence of the s´a¯stra on policy (he calls it the whole of his
teaching).14 In either formulation, we begin with the practice of self-
discipline as the means to effect mastery over the senses. So the ﬁrst
coercion that the king was to exercise, which was to form the basis of
all his subsequent policies, was in respect to his own mind and body.
Megasthenes’ observation about brahmins would seem to apply,
judging from the texts on nı¯ti, to the king as well: ‘they regard the body
as being the fruitful source of wars, and, as we have already shown,
ﬁght against it like soldiers in battle contending against the enemy’.15
So far we have explored the mastery of self in relation to the
pursuit of artha, but perhaps not surprisingly, the mastery of the
senses was also deemed a prerequisite for the proper pursuit of ka¯ma.
Judging from the texts, self-discipline was as general a characteristic
of the people at court in love as it was in other matters. The Na¯t. yas´a¯s-
tra, for example, includes dhı¯ra, self-control, as an integral character-
istic in all its categorizations of na¯yakas.16 The penultimate verse of
10 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.22.
11 Ibid.
12 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.21.
13 Ibid.
14 Kant.ı¯lya Arthas´a¯stra, ed. and trans. R. P. Kangle, 3 vols (Delhi: Motilal Barnasid-
ass, 1988), 1.6.1–3.
15 Indika, trans. J. W. McCrindle (London: Tnu¨bner, 1877), Fragm. 54.
16 Na¯t. yas´a¯stra, ed. Manomohan Ghosh, 2 vols (vol. 1, Delhi: Manisha Granthalaya,
1967; vol. 2, Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1956), 34.18–19.
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the Ka¯masu¯tra recommends that ‘he who knows the principles of this
s´a¯stra is one who has conquered his senses (jitendriya) and will be able
to conduct himself in the world and ﬁrmly guard dharma, artha and
ka¯ma.’17 It is perhaps peculiar to conceive of the enjoyment of pleas-
ures as entailing a conquest of one’s senses. While the true dynamics
of this conquest will become apparent in the following sections, Va¯ts-
ya¯yana’s general deﬁnition of ka¯ma is telling enough for the moment:
‘the activity of the sense-organs, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue
and the nose, when favourably disposed in their ﬁelds of operation,
as overseen by the mind (manas) along with the soul (a¯tmasam. yukta).’18
The senses must be engaged, ‘in contact’ as the succeeding verse
speciﬁes, with their particular ﬁelds (vis.aya), but simultaneously they
were to be ‘overseen’ or ‘directed’ by the mind. The word here is
adhis.t.hita, literally to ‘stand over’ or ‘superintend’. This was to be the
particular posture of the mind to the senses both in general and
particularly with regard to pleasure. Thus, ‘victory’ over the senses
did not entail their eradication, but rather their subordination and
control by their proper superintending agent, the mind. The mind
ruled the senses in the enjoyment of pleasure and it was in the mind
that the experience of ka¯ma was thought to arise, through resolution,
giving rise to its epithets ‘mind-born’ (manasija, manoja) and ‘will-
born’ (sam. kalpaja). We shall return momentarily to the importance
of the mind in the actions of the self, but here it will sufﬁce to note
that the proper enjoyment of pleasure is not conceived of in opposi-
tion to self-discipline and mastery of the senses, but as a proper
function of it.
The Dangers of the Senses
Why did the senses need to be conquered; why was such self-
discipline necessary? Each of the ﬁve senses, according to the Nı¯tisa¯ra,
was sufﬁcient to bring about the ruin (vina¯s´a) of a person.19 Ka¯man-
dakı¯ gives an example, for each sense, of an animal killed by its
pursuance—a deer lured by the melodious sound of the hunter’s
ﬂute, an elephant ensnared by his desire for the touch of a she-
elephant, and so on. For man, the vices that could arise from the
17 Ka¯masu¯tra 7.2.58.
18 Ka¯masu¯tra 1.2.11.
19 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.52.ff
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improper inﬂuence of the senses were many, and a list of six enemies
(s.adarivarga) is routinely cited by courtly texts as consisting of desire
(ka¯ma), anger (krodha), greed (lobha), conceit (ma¯na), rashness (mada)
and delight (hars.a).20 Avoiding these effected the conquest of the
senses, according to Kaut.ilya.21 These ‘enemies’, however, like the
senses themselves, were not absolute. All of them in their proper
measure could bring beneﬁt, but in excess were capable of trans-
forming themselves into vices destructive of a man’s interest and
fortune. Ka¯mandakı¯’s commentator, for example, explains hars.a, a
term usually positive in connotation, as ‘joy taken in the killing of
beings without sufﬁcient reason’.22 A number of vices arose from
anger and desire, the relative ranking of which was a matter of
debate among the s´a¯stra authors. Despite their status as ‘enemies’,
anger and desire had their utility—the former being necessary for
the suppression of evil and the latter for the enjoyment of fruits—in
the words of one author cited by Kaut.ilya.23 Though Kaut.ilya seems
to differ on this point, he elsewhere asserts that the king should not
deprive himself of pleasures but serve ka¯ma without contravening
artha and dharma.24
Control over the senses, then, was an ‘avoidance of errors’
(avipratipatti) in relation to each of the senses.25 These errors most
often took the form of an indulgence, an excessive pursuance of a
particular sense-domain. The manas, as the superintendent of the
senses, was ultimately responsible for the control of the senses, and
in the case of their straying, was complicit in such excess. Ka¯mandakı¯
says that the mind excites (prerayata) the senses with greed for sense-
objects as if they were meat preparations.26 Goaded on by an undis-
ciplined mind ‘running wildly like an elephant in the forest of the
sense-objects’,27 the senses ﬁxated on their objects to the detriment
of the self. In the hierarchic logic of the self ’s structure, the com-
20 Arthas´a¯stra 1.6.1;1.7.1; Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.57; Ka¯masu¯tra 5.5.38.
21 Arthas´a¯stra 1.6.1.
22 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.57 comm.
23 Arthas´a¯stra 8.3.8–12.
24 Arthas´a¯stra 8.3.13–22. Kaut.ilya differs with the above cited author, Bha¯radva¯ja,
over the issue of the relative seriousness of ka¯ma and krodha and not on their status
as vices as such. His remarks are, thus, somewhat curious, given that Bha¯radva¯ja,
not considering these qualities as vices, is not concerned at all with their relative
seriousness. For Kaut.ilya’s positive remarks on ka¯ma, see Arthas´a¯stra 1.7.3.
25 Arthas´a¯stra 6.1.2.
26 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.29.
27 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.27.
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mand of the mind included mastery over all that he should com-
mand. The conquest of the senses, in other words, began with the
mind. Ka¯mandakı¯ asks ‘how can one who cannot subdue the mind
(manasah. sannirbahane), conquer the earth bounded by the oceans?’28
The consequences of the mind and senses gone astray were
manifold. They could involve a violation of the hierarchical prin-
ciples of ‘law’, or dharma. The s´a¯stric literature cites such examples
in abundance. The Bhoja king Da¯n. d. akya, for example, seeing a
brahmin maiden while hunting, abducted her with desire, and
perished along with his family and kingdom as the result of her
father’s curse.29 Such admonitions would seem to imply a ‘repress-
ive’ code. The pursuit of sensual pleasures was not to contravene
the proper exercise of dharma. But in fact, they form one among
a much more varied set of dangerous eventualities which awaited
the man who indulged his senses. The excessive pursuit of one’s
senses left one exposed to one’s enemies. So a king overcome by
his desires for the objects of the senses was vulnerable to attack
like an elephant.30
But the most general danger in the pursuit of the senses was what
various sources, both courtly and monastic, called ‘attachment’. In
its broadest sense, attachment referred to life in the world, as
opposed to liberation from the world. More precisely, attachment
referred to a speciﬁc relation of involvement on the part of the self,
through the mind and the senses, with the outside world. Renunciat-
ive philosophies attributed it to different cognitive and mental
errors.31 Release and liberation from the fetters of worldly life thus
required a detachment from the objects of the senses. ‘Attachment’,
however, was an equally important concern at court. One of its
implications features prominently in medical texts concerned with
the health of the king, particularly around a disease known as
ra¯jayaks.man, ‘the royal disease’ or ‘king of diseases’.32 Caraka’s med-
ical treatise gives a detailed account of its origin, etiology and treat-
28 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.36.
29 Arthas´a¯stra 1.6.5; also Ka¯masu¯tra 1.2.44.
30 Nı¯tisa¯ra 1.40.
31 See the discussion of the term ra¯ga in relation to orthodox schools of philosophy
in Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1922).
32 The double-meaning of ra¯jayaks.man is noted and discussed by F. Zimmerman,
The Jungle and the Aroma of Meats: An Ecological Theme in Hindu Medicine (Berkeley:
University of California, 1987), p. 177.
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ment. According to Caraka, Daks.a, or Praja¯pati, gave his twenty-
eight daughters to the moon (soma) in marriage. But the moon
became overly attached (atisakta) to one of these daughters, Rohin. ı¯,
and neglected to take care of his body, which suffered a dimin-
ishment of unctuousness due to loss of vital ﬂuids.33 Because the
moon married all of the daughters of Praja¯pati but did not deal with
them equally, being excessively attached to one, Praja¯pati became
angry and exhaled his anger from his mouth. And ‘despised by the
great, treating his wives unequally, ﬁlled with rajas and weakness,
the moon was attacked by yaks.ma¯.’34 Praja¯pati eventually allowed the
moon to be treated by the physicians of the gods, the As´vins who
cured him. Yaks.ma¯ was then despatched to the human world by the
As´vins, where it entered into human beings through various
etiologies.
The invective here is not against pleasure as such. The cause of
the moon’s afﬂiction is his over-attachment to one of his wives and
the consequent neglect of his others, literally the ‘non-enjoyment’
(asam. bhoga) of his other wives.35 Among the etiologies of the disease
in the human world was ‘excessive thinning’ (atikars´ana) which could
be caused by a variety of factors: pining for a lover (utkan. t.ha¯) or
overindulgence in sexual intercourse (ativyava¯ya).36 The emphasis
here is on ‘excessive’ sensual indulgence which initiated a physical
wasting.
The ﬁnal book of the Raghuvam. s´a ends with the blight of
ra¯jayaks.man, the story of king Agnivarn. a. Installed on the throne by
his father, the king conducts his affairs for some years in person, and
then consigns them to his ministers, and devotes himself wholly to
the pursuit of pleasures. Ka¯lida¯sa describes at length the king’s dalli-
ances with the various women of the palace—his wives, courtesans,
dancers and attendants. But he hints that all is not right.
Unable to bear even the interval of a single moment without the enjoyment
of the objects of the senses (indriya¯rtha), spending day and night in the
indoors, he had no regard for his longing subjects. If upon the counsel of
his ministers he deigned to give appearance (dars´anam. ) to his expectant
subjects, he did so by hanging a foot from the opening of a window.37
33 Agnives´a Carakasam. hita¯, ed. and trans. R. K. Sharma and V.B. Dash, 3 vols
(Varanasi: Chowkhamba Publications, 1983), 6.8.4 ff.
34 Carakasam. hita¯ 6.8.7.
35 Carakasam. hita¯ 6.8.5.
36 Carakasam. hita¯ 6.8.24.
37 Raghuvam˙s´a 19.6–7.
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The dependants (anujı¯vin) of his court bow and honour his extended
foot. The king’s neglect of his subjects and supplicants forebodes the
worst. Though due to his power he remains safe from his enemies,
he begins to thin (aks.in. ot) from a disease ‘born of attachment to
pleasure’ (ratira¯gasam. bhava).38 Agnivarn. a ignores the counsel of his
physicians as ra¯jayaks.man becomes apparent. His face pales, his voice
weakens, he is unable to adorn himself, and can walk only when
supported by his servants. Raghu’s family Kalida¯sa signiﬁcantly com-
pares to the sky with the moon on its last digit. The comparison is
signiﬁcant. The moon, or Soma, who was progenitor of the rains, and
the waters, was the ﬁrst victim of ra¯jayaks.ma. His ‘thinning’, according
to Caraka, was due to snehaks.aya, speciﬁed by his commentator as the
loss of semen and vital life ﬂuid.39 The king’s loss of ﬂuid, like that
of the moon, led to the inevitable ‘drying up’ of his sovereignty. The
case of ra¯jayaks.ma demonstrates that the enjoyment of sexual pleas-
ures, which ordinarily caused a tumescence and plumpness of the
body, could also lead, if improperly pursued, to the reverse process
of desiccation, and in some cases even death. Agnivarn. a is not as
fortunate as Soma; he eventually dies in his palace garden, attended
by his ministers and the royal physician.
Overattachment and its attendant wasting was not seen as simply
a dissipation resulting from pleasure itself, but instead as a disarticu-
lation of selfhood. The wasting of ra¯jayaks.ma could in some cases,
Caraka tells us, be caused by excessive reducing (atikars´ana) from
prolonged pining for a lover (utkan. t.ha¯).40 Va¯tsya¯yana corroborates the
list of in his ten ‘stages of desire’ (ka¯mastha¯na). He begins with pleas-
ure of the eyes (caks.uprı¯ti), followed by a ﬁxation of the mind
(manasan˙ga), and then the arising of ‘resolve’ (sam˙kalpa utpatti).41
After a progression from the senses to the mind, which becomes
slowly attached to the object of desire there is a steady progression
of attachment, calibrated by symptoms, beginning with loss of sleep
(nidra¯ccheda), physical emaciation (tanuta¯), turning away from (other)
objects of the senses (vis.ayebhyo via¯vr.tti), loss of shame (lajja¯pran. a¯s´a),
madness (unma¯da), fainting (mu¯rccha¯), and ﬁnally, as in ra¯jayaks.ma,
death (maran.am).42 What is interesting in Va¯tsya¯yana’s account of
38 Raghuvam˙s´a 19.48.
39 Cited in Zimmerman, Jungle and the Aroma of Meats, p. 177.
40 Carakasam. hita¯ 6.8.24.
41 The term sam˙kalpa, as noted before, refers to the mind’s organization of the
diffuse sensations coming from the senses into desire, will or violation.
42 Ka¯masu¯tra 5.1.4.4–5.
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the stages of attachment is the advice he gives to avoid the process
of physical degeneration: ‘when he sees desire progressing from one
stage to the next, then, with the goal of preserving his own body
from harm, he may approach another’s wife.’43 So self-preservation
in the face of wasting from overattachment becomes the pretext for
Va¯tsya¯yana to prescribe not merely sexual relations, but the violation
of patriarchal privilege by sexual relations with another man’s wife.
In some cases, then, the dangers of attachment could be avoided by
entering into sexual liaisons rather than curtailing them. Da¯modara-
gupta says that while sexual intercourse with one’s wife was neces-
sary for progeny, sexual intercourse with servants (cet.ika) may be
necessary for the abatement of sickness (from excessive desire).44
The problem of attachment was not about the morality of the sexual
relationship itself, and did not take the form of a body of consistent
interdictions against particular acts, behaviours or liaisons. It instead
concerned the disposition that the self was to have with the external
world as a whole. The senses posed the danger of a loss of
self-mastery.
Attachment and Autonomy: the Dynamic of Courtly Relations
To grasp the full signiﬁcance of self-mastery for courtly elites, it is
necessary to see these problems from another angle. We have seen
that there were, according to the policy manuals, good reasons for
the noble man to avoid attachment to sensual pleasures. Further, his
self-restraint was seen to be a token of his ﬁtness to stand above his
social inferiors. In this sense, the condition of self-mastery was
always opposed to various states of dependence and slavery. In the
courtly world, self-restraint was a mark of freedom.
The life of men at court may be viewed simultaneously in relation
to two poles: svatantra, or ‘dependence on oneself’, and paratantra,
‘dependence on another’. Terms for gaining one’s livelihood by the
agency of another were anujı¯vin or upajı¯vin. Much of the gnomic and
didactic literature of the court denigrates the condition of depend-
ence and elevates that of independence. A ninth-century inscription
which records the Pratı¯ha¯ra king Na¯gabhat.t.a’s defeat of Cakrayudha
43 Ka¯masu¯tra 5.1.3.
44 Kut.t.anı¯mata 812, cited in Ganikavr.ttasan
. graha, ed. Ludwik Sternbach
(Hoshı¯arpur: Vishveshvaranand Institute Publications, 1953), 3.
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of Kanauj, who was in the service of the Pa¯la king Dharmapa¯la, says
that Cakrayudha had a ‘lowly demeanour clearly obvious from his
dependence on another’.45 As the hero of one story in the ﬁfteenth-
century Purus.aparı¯ks.a¯ puts it: ‘cowards, children and women live by
taking refuge in others.’46 Such attitudes, however, must be placed
within a political context of multiple and complex dependencies.
Most men of rank at court enjoyed varying degrees of automony by
virtue of their service to higher lords as princes, generals, retainers,
or ministers. It is these men who formed the larger audience for the
prescriptive and aesthetic literatures of the court, and whose prob-
lems are embodied in these literatures.
Autonomy and dependence were often viewed in relation to the
acquisition and disposition of wealth. What constituted independ-
ence in terms of wealth was a perennial theme for the moralists of
the court. Again and again they are clear on this point. According to
the vit.a in I¯s´varadatta’s Dhu¯rtavit.asam. va¯da,
There are three ends of money: making gifts, enjoyment and hoarding. Of
these gifts and enjoyment are superior, and hoarding has been censored.
Why? In hoarding money there is no beneﬁt, and being without beneﬁt, it
creates no satisfaction. Hence hoarding is improper.47
Bhartr.hari adds from another point of view:
Giving, enjoying and losing are the three ways through which the amount
of one’s wealth can be lessened. The wealth of a man who neither gives nor
enjoys his wealth can only be lessened by the third way.48
Giving and enjoying, then, are the most honourable ways of disposing
of one’s wealth. Preserving money (nidha¯na), on the other hand, was
a sign of the vice of ‘miserliness’ (kr.pan.a). Signiﬁcantly, the
Purus.aparı¯ks.a¯ calls miserliness a form of cowardice (ka¯tara): if a man
is fearful about his life he was called coward; if he was fearful about
his wealth he was known as a miser.49
Generosity, by contrast, was among the most praiseworthy of vir-
tues, the proper complement to wealth itself. All the prescriptive
texts are in agreement as to the good beneﬁts of giving wealth, and
45 Epigraphia Indica 18 (1925–26), no. 13, p. 106.
46 Vidya¯pati T. ha¯kkura Purus.aparı¯ks.a¯, ed. Ganganatha Jha (Allahabad: Belvedere
Steam Press, 1911), 1.3.2.
47 Dhu¯rtavit.asam. va¯da, ed. and trans. Manomohan Ghosh (Calcutta: Manisha Gran-
thalaya Ltd, 1975), 59.
48 S´ribhartr.hari, Subha¯s.itatris´ati rev. and ed. Narayana Rama Acarya and D. D. Kos-
ambi (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan, 1987), 1.34.
49 Purus.aparı¯ks.a¯ 1.7.1.
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verses abound in the aphoristic literature praising giving (da¯na).
Generosity was a sign of independence as it presupposed not only
self-subsistence, but the ability to make others dependent upon one-
self. Through generosity one became a refuge for others. Put more
cynically, in the shrewd words of I¯s´varadatta’s vit.a, ‘making gifts was
a means of bringing others under one’s control.’50 Generosity was
the necessary complement of wealth according to texts on the court.
Courtly aphorisms tirelessly reiterate that being generous (da¯tara)
attracted others to oneself regardless of one’s birth and other vir-
tues.51 Considering that the concept of largesse formed the dominant
‘rationality’ in the redistribution of wealth among the ruling classes,
its importance can hardly be underestimated.52
This ethic toward wealth, of spending or giving, could also contrib-
ute, in adverse circumstances, to sudden penury. Among kings and
princes, the depletion of resources forced one to attend the court of
a greater king. Similarly for others of rank, the loss of fortune por-
tended the abandonment of one’s own retinue and the entry into the
service of others. This is precisely the background of that peculiar
character of courtly life, who forms the comic and wry narrator of
the bha¯n. a monologue plays which have already been cited above, the
vit.a. The vit.a was a well-regarded man, learned in the arts of pleas-
ure, who according to Yas´odhara, the commentator on the Ka¯masu¯tra,
once led the lifestyle of the na¯garaka, but having subsequently con-
sumed his wealth, was now dependent for his livelihood on cour-
tesans and na¯garakas.53 The vit.a possessed all of the qualiﬁcations of
the na¯yaka except for ﬁnancial independence, and therefore was
deemed a lesser member of ‘good society’. According to Ks.emendra,
the vit.a was broken by debts (r.n. ena khan. d.ita).54 His knowledge of the
affairs of pleasure, however, was legion, and in Sanskrit dramas he
formed an advisor (mantrin) for na¯yika¯ and na¯yaka55 In the bha¯n. a
monologue plays, the vit.a walks through the courtesans’ quarters in
conversation with those he meets on the street. The Na¯t. yas´a¯stra
places the vit.a among the mixed characters of the drama, who, des-
pite his birth, knowledge and reﬁnement, was unsuitable for the role
50 Dhu¯rtavit.asam. va¯da 29+.
51 Nı¯tisa¯ra 5.60.
52 See, for example, Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan
. graha 82–101.
53 Ka¯masu¯tra 1.4.45, and comm.
54 Ks.emendra Des´opades´a in Ks.emendralaghuka¯vyasan
. graha, ed. V. V. Ra¯ghavacarya and
D. G. Padhye (Hyderabad: Sanskrit Academy, 1961), 5.24.
55 Ka¯masu¯tra 1.4.47.
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of na¯yaka because his poverty made him a low character.56 The lead-
ing character of a drama, the na¯yaka, was one who succeeded in for-
tune, who was literally ‘elevated’ or ‘lifted up’ from adverse condi-
tions.57 Such was the fate of the virtuous brahmin Ca¯rudatta in
S´u¯draka’s Mr.cchakat.ika. The play begins with Ca¯rudatta’s pathetic
lament on his new-found, poignant verses which take their place
among the best poetry on the subject. The ‘burning’ thing about
poverty, according to Ca¯rudatta, is that guests (atithi) avoid
(parivarjayanti) a house of diminished wealth (gr.ham ks.ı¯na¯rtham) and
people slacken their friendship (sauhr.da) to one whose support of
wealth is destroyed.58 By the play’s end, however, Ca¯rudatta has
gained a position of favour at the king’s court which enables him to
exercise his own favour and generosity once again.
Poverty in the eyes of Ca¯rudatta, as in the hundreds of courtly
maxims on the subject, was so painful because it prevented the dis-
play of generosity and favours which structured the relations
between members of equal rank in the form of hospitality and friend-
ship and relations between men of rank and their inferiors in the
form of the provision of livelihoods. Ultimately, poverty destroyed
one’s autonomy and subjected one to greater and greater depend-
ence on others. The anxiety over wealth apparent in the courtly aph-
orisms reﬂected a perception of the precariousness of autonomy
within the chain of greater and lesser dependencies which character-
ized the feudal e´lite in medieval India. For every maxim that wealth
and power drew retainers and made one a refuge of the world,
another followed that losing one’s wealth, and failure to provide suf-
ﬁcient honours, brought calamity. Good men would abandon a lord
like a calf abandoning its mother’s udder when its milk was dry.59 To
round off the discussion, the ethical problem that faced men at
courts was this: how was it possible to maintain autonomy within a
world of dependence? How was a man to negotiate his relations with
others precariously but ineluctably situated between the poles of
autonomy and dependence? That this situation constituted a concern
is clearly indicated by the persistent exaltation and derision of
56 Na¯t. yas´a¯stra 34.14–16.
57 Na¯t. yas´a¯stra 34.23.
58 S´u¯draka, Mr.cchakat.ika, ed. and trans. R. D. Karmakar (Poona: Aryabhushan
Press, 1937), 1.12; 1.13.
59 Nı¯tisa¯ra 5.63; see also Nı¯tisa¯ra 5.59, 62; Arthas´a¯stra 5.5.12; Ca¯n.akya, Ca¯n. akyara¯-
janı¯ti, ed. Ludwik Sternbach (Madras: Adyar Library, 1963), 181.
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wealth and poverty, and the states of mastery and service they
implied, within the discourses of the court.
The relation between superiors and inferiors, between relatively
autonomous and relatively dependent agencies, was expressed
through a speciﬁc and limited set of expressions and practices, sev-
eral of which will be relevant for the discussion at hand. From the
very inception of political discourses, but particularly from Gupta
times, inscriptions and courtly texts frequently describe the relations
of lords and their subordinates through the language of attach-
ment.60 ‘Attachment’ in courtly discourses referred not merely to a
person’s disposition towards the external world in a general sense,
but often, more speciﬁcally to the particular relationship he or she
had with other individuals. That is to say, the most common form of
attachment we ﬁnd in the discourses of the court is one person’s
‘attachment’ to another. The term most often used to describe this
relation of attachment to another person is anura¯ga. The root ran˜j
(lit. ‘reddening’) meant to be affected or attracted by someone or
something. Preceded by the purposive sufﬁx anu ‘to follow’, anura¯ga/
anurakta had an even stronger sense of being ‘attracted to’ or
‘attached to’ someone. The allied term bhakti denoted a disposition
of ‘devoted participation’ toward a superior agent which involved
subordinate participation in one’s master’s lordship. A few examples
will give a sense of this vocabulary. In the famous Juna¯gad. h rock
inscription, dated to the Gupta era in the ﬁfth century AD, one
Parn. adatta, described as a servant (bhr.tya) of the king Skandagupta,
and appointed to rule Saura¯s.t.ra, is described as ‘devoted’ (bhakti)
and ‘attached’ (anurakta) to his lord.61 An early sixth-century inscrip-
tion from Eran records that the wife of one Gopara¯ja, who died on
the battleﬁeld in the service of his lord Bha¯nugupta, being devoted
(bhakti) and ‘attached’ (anurakta) to her husband, followed him to
heaven on the funeral pyre.62 The famous court poet of Hars.a (606–
47), Ba¯n. abhat.t.a, writing at the beginning of the seventh century,
describes the kings from various countries who attend the court of
60 For two pre-Gupta examples, see Kharavela’s Hathigumpha inscription which
refers to the king Kharavela as ‘causing the people to be pleased and attached to
him.’ (ran˜jayati pakatiyo), Epigraphia Indica 20 (1929–30), no. 7, p. 79; and the Juna-
gadh rock inscription of Rudrada¯man which claims that his subjects were attached
to him (prakr.ti anuraktena). Epigraphia Indica 8 (1905–6), no. 6, p. 44.
61 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 14, p. 59.
62 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 21, p. 93.
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Hars.a as ‘attached’ to his splendour (prata¯pa¯nura¯gagata).63 And ﬁnally,
an eighth-century inscription from Western India refers on the one
hand to the hereditary servants of a dynasty as ‘attached to the king
through affection’ (anura¯ga¯nurakta),64 and later refers to sa¯mantas
paying obeisance to the king through the ‘attachment produced by
his splendour’ (prata¯p-a¯nura¯ga-pran.ata-samasta-sa¯manta).65
Viewed as a process, anurakta denoted the attraction or drawing of
one person to another; courtly representations typically mention vir-
tues and powers which attract others to oneself. Virtues generally
had the effect of making one ‘attractive’—literally ‘pulling’ others
towards oneself. Numerous inscriptions mention the bonds of service
and afﬁliation being based on the attraction or attachment to the
qualities of one’s lord. A typical attribute of kings which attracted
others, for example, was ‘splendour’ (prata¯pa) as cited in the
examples above. A later inscription refers to the Kalinga king Anan-
tavarman as having the entire circle of vassals (sa¯mantas) attracted
to him by virtue of the excellence of his threefold power
(s´aktitrayaprakars.a¯nuran˜jita).66 But inscriptions often make more gen-
eral reference to the virtues of kings and lords. A southern S´ı¯la¯ha¯ra
grant of the eleventh century describes a Ra¯s.t.raku¯t.a king as ‘attract-
ive by his royal qualities’ (nr.pagun.aramanı¯ya).67 In the famous Mand-
asor inscription which recounts the emigration of a guild of silk
weavers to Das´apura and their request for favour from the reigning
king of the region, the silk weavers proclaim that they are ‘attracted
to the virtues’ (gun. a¯pahr.ta) of the king.68 Together, these inscriptions
make explicit one of the chief goals of self-cultivation and moral
perfection—to gain the attachment of others in the world. The texts
on polity like the Nı¯tisa¯ra and Arthas´a¯stra exhort the king to develop
virtues within himself which are called abhiga¯mika gun.as, literally,
‘qualities which invite’.69 Having inviting qualities would attract
dependents and allies to a lord. A seventh-century inscription of the
Ka¯marupa king Bha¯skaravarman is explicit about it: the king is
63 Hars.acarita, p. 60.
64 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 39, p. 173.
65 Ibid., p. 178.
66 Epigraphia Indica 24 (1937–38), no. 17, p. 135. The threefold-power, according
to Arthas´a¯stra 6.3.33, refers to the power of counsel (mantras´akti), might (prabhus´akti)
and effort (utsa¯has´akti). Counsel consists of the power of knowledge; might consists
of the power of treasury and army, and effort the power of valour.
67 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 6 (1977), no. 40, p. 180.
68 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 18, p. 81.
69 Arthas´a¯stra 6.1.3; see also Nı¯tisa¯ra 4.6–8.
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described as having people ‘attached to his inviting qualities’
(a¯bhiga¯mikagun. a¯nura¯ga).70 In an eighth-century inscription, even the
goddess of fortune is attracted to the inviting qualities (abhiga¯mika
gun.as) of the Gurjara king Ahirola.71
Attachment as Subjection
What constituted this attachment? In the inscription of Ahı´rda, the
poet tells us that it is the mind (manas) of Laks.mı¯ that was fervently
attached to the king.72 In the preceding discussion we learned that
it was the mind which oversaw, through its mastery of the senses,
the self’s relation with the external world. If we see the problem of
attachment as one not simply between the self and the world but
between selves, then we may see the role of the mind in courtly dis-
courses slightly differently. The mind was the ‘zone of engagement’
for the dynamics of attachment and detachment which articulated
the relations of courtly selves. As the locale of social dispositions and
sentiments, the mind was the place where afﬁliation resided, and
where the battle of affections took place. The texts most often speak
of the attachment of people’s minds as a sort of ‘capturing’. We may
see early examples of this in some of the hymns of the Atharvaveda,
the methods of which were later appended to the courtly knowledges
of the Arthas´a¯stra and Ka¯masu¯tra as ‘secret’ (aupanis.adika). In one rite
to attain ‘victory’ in the assembly (sabha¯), the performer was to eat
milk-porridge, take hold of the pillars of the assembly hall and pay
the assembly hall respect while reciting the following hymn ‘if your
mind (manas) has wandered to a distance (para¯gatam) or been tied
(baddham) here or there, then we draw it here (vartaya¯masi). May your
mind (manas) take delight (ramata¯m. ) in me’.73 In another Atharva
hymn which sought to procure harmony within the assembly, the
performer was to chant
70 Epigraphia Indica 19 (1927–28), no. 19, p. 118. See also the eighth-century
inscription of the Gurjara king Ahirola which claims that even the goddess of for-
tune is attracted to the inviting qualities (abhiga¯mika gun.as) of the king, Corpus
Inscriptionum Indicarum 4 (1955), no. 24, p. 105.
71 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 4 (1955), no. 24, p. 105.
72 Ibid. See also Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 4 (1955), no. 12, p. 41.
73 Atharvaveda 7.12. For practices associated with this hymn, based on Kes´ava’s
commentary on Kaus´ikasu¯tra, see M. Bloomﬁeld, Hymns of the Atharva-Veda: Together
with the Extracts from the Ritual Books and the Commentaries (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1897), p. 543.
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We cause your minds, vows, plans to bend (nama¯masi). Those devoted to
other purposes (vivrata¯) we cause to bend (namaya¯masi). I seize your minds
with my mind (gr.hna¯mi manasa¯ mana¯m. s). Your thoughts will follow my
thoughts (citamanu cittebhireta). I place your hearts (hr.daya¯ni) in my control.
Direct yourself towards me after my course.74
These hymns, connected with secret rites, were only to be employed
in special circumstances, when policy and strategy as detailed in the
bulk of the Arthas´a¯stra and Ka¯masu¯tra failed. In a peculiar way they
thus reveal quite well the unveiled ambition of courtly practice.
Although they do not use the term anurakta, they anticipate its logic
by referring to the untying of the opponent’s mind from its current
mooring and drawing it to oneself where it would ‘take delight’. The
goal of policy and strategy at court was to bend and capture the mind
(mano grah) of others and thereby to cause them to submit in some
way to oneself. The imagery of ‘seizing’ another’s mind or ‘causing
it to bend’ is highly signiﬁcant. The comportment of the body was
ultimately linked to the disposition of the mind, and becoming
attached to someone entailed bodily gestures which reﬂected the
condition of the mind. One bowed because one’s mind was drawn in
a deferential manner toward another person. Attachment was envi-
sioned as a ‘leaning toward’, or ‘inclination’ of the mind, which led
to the inclining of the body in the direction of another. So it is per-
haps not surprising that in the eighth-century inscription from India
cited above, feudatories are said to bow down to their lord from
Figure 2.
74 Atharvaveda 6.94. This hymn appears with six others which are together desig-
nated as ‘designed to bring harmony’ (sa¯m˙manasya¯ni) and is associated with rituals
which include eating the pickled ﬂesh of young calves. For details, see Bloomﬁeld,
pp. 360–1.
COURTSH IP IN MED IEVAL IND IA 125
excessive attachment to his splendour (prata¯p-a¯nura¯ga-pran. ata).75 The
self in such a situation may be pictured in Figure 2, keeping in mind
our earlier image of the self. In this representation, the internal
order of the self we saw above is disrupted as the self literally gravit-
ates through attraction toward another. Attachment meant the par-
tial surrender of one’s own self-mastery, through a re-direction of
the disposition of the mind and the external ‘instruments’ (karan. as)
which it ruled (the senses as well as the motor organs) to the service
of another being.
This submission entailed ‘control’ of others, a concept indicated in
Sanskrit by the term vas´a, often translated as ‘inﬂuence’ or ‘subjuga-
tion’. TheAtharva hymn cited above speaks of placing the heart of one’s
opponent ‘in the control’ (vas´es.u) of the reciter. Subjugation could be
exercised over a number of domains—ﬁrst and foremost of which was
one’s own self. We hear of rulers as being ‘self-controlled’ (a¯tmavas´a),76
a condition which presupposed, as we mentioned above, the conquest
of the senses and the restraint of the mind. Conversely, attachment to
pleasures, for example, is often said to entail a disorder—the control
of the mind by the senses. In Hars.a’s Ratna¯valı¯, a woman is observed to
be moving unsteadily during the Spring Festival because she is ‘con-
trolled by passion’ (madanavas´a).77 The term vas´a also referred to the
effecting or extension of one’s wishes over another person, akin to the
modern notion of ‘inﬂuence’. A thirteenth-century inscription of the
later Ra¯s.t.raku¯t.as refers to a counsellor who exercised ‘fascinating con-
trol (vas´ika¯ram) over his friends’.78 The goal of royal policy, according
to theArthas´a¯stra, was for the king to use the beneﬁt of livelihood, along
with his wealth and the army, to ‘bring under his control’ (vası¯karoti)
both his own party (svapaks.am) and other parties (parapaks.am).79 In
reviewing the importance of dan. d.aKaut.ilya cites one school of thought
which held that coercion was the most effective means for the entire
polity to be ‘brought under control’ (vas´opanayanam).80 While Kaut.ilya
disagrees with the proposition that coercion should be the sole instru-
ment of rule, he hardly differs on the goal of policy. Bringing other par-
ties under one’s control wasmost effectively achieved throughpeaceful
75 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 39, p. 178.
76 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 14, p. 59.
77 Hars.a Ratna¯valı¯ ed. and trans. C. R. Devadhar and N. G. Suru (Poona: Ganesh
Printing Works, 1925), 1.12+.
78 Epigraphia Indica 13 (1915–16), no. 3a, p. 20.
79 Arthas´a¯stra 1.4.2.
80 Arthas´a¯stra 1.4.6.
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means, as when a vit.a remarks at a salon of reﬁned men (gos.t.h. ı¯) in the
Dhu¯rtvit.asam. va¯da, that giving gifts was a means of bringing the people
of the world in general (lokasya), but particularly courtesans, under
one’s control.81
The language of capture and seizure, however, indicates that rela-
tions of attachment were also in part agonistic. Attachment was most
essentially a submission of one mind to another. It compromised the
relative autonomy of the servant and secured the relative autonomy
of the master. Expectedly, then, ‘attachment’ could also be achieved
through the direct or indirect threat of force. When an eighth-
century inscription from Western India describes sa¯mantas who bow
down to king Kharagraha because they had been ‘violently subdued
(sarabhasavas´ikr.ta) by excessive attachment (atiprakr.s.t.a¯nura¯ga) (for
him),’ more than a hint of coercion may be implied.82 One of the
ends of the policy of war in the nı¯ti texts was the submission of the
defeated king to the victor which was expressed as an attachment of
the defeated king’s self/mind as ruler of its own organs/instruments
with their external domains, to a new lord.
We may sum up the discussion as follows. The relations between
men at court were characterized by strategies which entailed draw-
ing others to themselves by attracting or ‘capturing’ their minds. In
such relations the self remained relatively unattached, with the pro-
viso that its own autonomous agency was often enjoyed by virtue of
its attachment to even higher agencies. The fear of dependence was
an anxiety behind courtly strategy. The Mudra¯ra¯ks.asa says that acting
in the interests of others causes one’s own interests to suffer and
thus causes one to become servile. And being dependent on another,
it was impossible to experience the taste of pleasure.83 The goal of
royal policy, in a sense, was to limit the internal masteries of all
servants, companions and rivals within the king’s sphere of mastery
and thus gain their submission or attachment, while remaining rela-
tively ‘unattached’ vis a` vis these relations himself.
The same antagonism could potentially underlie the servant’s rela-
tion with his lord. As Ha¯la puts it, ‘though being dependent on his
own will (a¯tmavas´a), a good man of noble birth may submit to
another, even if hated, with the complexion (or attachment—ra¯ga)
81 Dhu¯rtavit.asam. va¯da 29+.
82 Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 3 (1888), no. 39, p. 177.
83 Vis´a¯khadatta, Mudra¯ra¯ks.asa, ed. A. Hillebrandt (Breslau: H. and M. Marcus,
1912), 3.4.
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of his face unchanged, and follow his wishes.’84 The nı¯ti texts recom-
mend that the king placate his dependants, for treating them with
improper respect could potentially lead to being abandoned or even
being killed.85 The courtier’s advancement through circles of the
court and his gaining of superior favour could often entail antagon-
istic policies toward his lord, as when in the Purus.aparı¯ks.a the prince
Malladeva, who attends the court of Jayacandra, leaves the court of
his lord in order to challenge him to battle in the hope of gaining
the king’s favour by a display of valour.86 The jackal-minister Dam-
anaka in the ﬁrst book of the Pan˜catantra, when he sees his own sover-
eign Pin˙galaka’s weakness, conﬁdes to his friend that ‘this very day
I will catch him while he is overcome with fear and by the power of
my intelligence bring him under my control (prajn˜a¯prabha¯ven. a¯tmı¯yam˙
karis. ya¯mi)’.87 In these cases an internal constituent of the kingdom,
one of the king’s own ‘instruments’, attempts to exercise his will over
his master, and is ultimately, as the story unfolds, successful.
The mutual antagonism which could underlie relationships at
court is best revealed, I would submit, by the persistent ambivalence
to attachment and dependency in the aphoristic literature. Servit-
ude, devotion, and attachment were on the one hand elevated to the
most perfect of virtues and on the other denigrated as the basest of
conditions. It was better to go to the forest than to be dependent on
another. Moralists of the court decry the pathos of servitude and
denigrate lords for their pride and cruelty, while at the same time
blaming servants for their greed. The apparently simple posture of
devotion that a servant was to have toward his lord, along with the
reciprocal disposition of favour the lord was to display toward his
dependant—relations which formed the very sinews of afﬁliation at
court—were undergirded by complex antagonisms which the lan-
guage attachment was fully capable of sustaining.
Courtship and the Language of Paramours
Before turning to the ‘ideological’ dimension of courtship as it is rep-
resented in courtly poetry, it will be useful to sketch a brief reconstruc-
84 Ha¯la Gatha¯saptas´atı¯, ed. and trans. Radhagovinda Basak (Calcutta: Asiatic Soci-
ety, 1971), 3.65.
85 See Nı¯tisa¯ra 5.68.
86 Purus.aparı¯ks.a¯ 1.3.1ff.
87 Pan˜catantra, ed. and trans. Francis Edgerton, 2 vols (New Haven: American
Oriental Society, 1924), 1.18+.
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tion of the contexts in which ‘courtship’ may have actually occurred. In
the higher forms of marriage laid out in the s´a¯stras, to be practised by
the upper varn.as and deeply enmeshed in the acquisition and perpetu-
ation of property and/or authority, prospective wives were to be
secured by arrangement, through the ‘selection’ (varan. a) and/or ‘gift
of a maiden’ (kanya¯da¯na). Marriage was an institution explicitly used
to build political alliance and open avenues of economic exchange
between ‘houses’—families as politico-economic units. For the ruling
elite of medieval Indian courts, of putative ks.atriya lineage, selection
and marriage was the most important method of sealing political alli-
ances between kings. Wars between rival kings were often concluded
with the defeated house offeringwomen inmarriage to the victors. The
practice of kanya¯da¯na, as Thomas Trautmann has demonstrated,
tended to establish the superiority of the groom’s family over that of
the bride.88 Even for others of standing, selection seems to have been
the dominant formofmarriage. Va¯tsya¯yana begins his book on ‘acquir-
ing awife’ with a discussion not of the relations between the na¯yaka and
na¯yika¯, but between the na¯garaka and the family of the prospective
bride, implying the context of varan. a/kanya¯da¯na.
Among ks.atriyasmarriagewas in some cases arranged through a svay-
am˙vara, or ‘self-choice’, where the daughter of a superior king chose
from a group of suitors drawn from allies or powerful underlords of her
father. The svayam˙vara also ended with a ‘gift of a maiden’ but may not
have indicated the subordination of the giving king.89 The svayam˙vara
is an important event in theMaha¯bha¯rata, and became an increasingly
popular theme in later ka¯vya, particularly the story of Nala andDamay-
antı¯.90 The svayam˙vara would seem to offer one context for the display
of male virtue vaguely akin to conceptions of chivalric romance in
medieval Europe. It was certainly not, however, the dominant mode of
brokering marriages among the courtly elite, and seems to have been
more of a literary theme than anything else. The romance which
88 Thomas Trautmann, Dravidian Kinship (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), p. 26.
89 See Nais.hadhı¯yacaritam 16.10–12.
90 Noted by Johann Meyer, Sexual Life in Ancient India (New York: Dorset Press,
1995), p. 78, n. 3 and B.N.S. Yadava, Society and Culture in Northern India in the Twelfth
Century (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1973), p. 70. In addition to S´rı¯hars.a’s
Nais.hadhı¯yacaritam versions of this story include the Nalodaya of Kalida¯sa (uncertain
date and ascription); the Nalacampu¯ of Trivikrama-Bhat.t.a (9th century); the
Nais.adha¯nandana¯t.aka of Ks.emı¯s´vara (9th–10th century); the Sahr.daya¯nanda of
Kr.s.n. a¯nanda (13th century); and the Nala¯bhyudaya of Va¯manabhat.t.aba¯na (15th
century).
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unfolds in the Nala/Damayantı¯ story is peculiar in that the protagon-
ists fall in love and begin to pine without ever having seen one another,
a fact which highlights the role of ‘fame’—exhibited through female
beauty asmuch asmale prowess—in drawing families together inmar-
riage, rather than the rudiments of courtship.
In both the kanya¯da¯na and svayam˙vara, as in the more embracing
rites of ‘selection’ (varan. a) of which they were variants, the scope
for premarital courtship was limited. Only one form of the s´a¯strically
sanctioned marriages, the ga¯ndharva, was understood as the culmina-
tion of the mutual affection of the bride and groom and obviously
entailed pre-marital courtship.91 Whatever the prevalence of this
form of marriage, the context of marital courtship presumed in the
bulk of the Ka¯masu¯tra’s discussion of the acquisition of a wife revolves
around ‘creating conﬁdence’ (visrambhan.am) in the bride (kanya¯),
during the ﬁrst days after the marriage ceremony.92 This was no doubt
the typical context for courtship, and one that was undoubtedly com-
plicated by the existence of co-wives and other women in the house
sexually available to the patriarch. Both the Ka¯masu¯tra and later
manuals like Kokkoka’s Ratirahasya recommend three nights of celib-
acy after the marriage ceremony, to which Va¯tsya¯yana adds another
seven, before the groom was to begin wooing the bride.93 Both texts
are emphatic that the husband avoid rash or untimely sexual
advances without ﬁrst gaining the conﬁdence of the bride.94 This is
because, we are told, when a man approaches a woman suddenly, he
engenders fear, disgust, dejection and is detested in her mind; and
when she feels no affection, she becomes ruined by anxiety, she may
perhaps come to hate men in general, her husband, or may then go
91 Va¯tsya¯yana begins the third chapter of his book on acquiring a wife by advising
the man who lacks the proper qualiﬁcations for the marriage negotiation, not to
enter into the selection ceremony because he would not be able to obtain a maiden
(Ka¯masu¯tra 3.3.1 ff). In this case he was to win her over himself
(svayamevamanuran˜jayet) by courting that began in her childhood. Va¯tsya¯yana then
cites Ghotamukha’s opinion that this type of wooing (sam. vananam), in a girl’s child-
hood, pure and according to dharma, is praiseworthy (Ka¯masu¯tra 3.3.4). Following
chapters provide various strategies for the cultivation of a mutual attraction
between the prospective partners before marriage. The ga¯ndharva marriage, accord-
ing to Va¯tsya¯yana, was the superior form because it was attained without much
difﬁculty, without a ceremony of ‘selection’ (avaran. a), and was based on mutual
affection or attachment (anura¯ga¯tmakatva¯t) which was said to be the ‘fruit’ of all
marriage in any event (Ka¯masu¯tra 3.5.29–30).
92 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.2.1.
93 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.2.1; Kokkoka, Ratirahasya ed. Ramananda Sharma (Varnasi: Krishn-
adas Academy, 1994), 11.8.
94 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.2.4–6; Ratirahasya 11.8.
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to another man.95 It is concluded that a man who knows how to win
the conﬁdence of women, increase their attachment, and cause their
affection toward him, becomes beloved among them.96 Post-marital
courtship suggests a clear recognition that marriage and affection,
though related, were quite distinct. Courtship formed a way of ‘regu-
lating’ the initial period of marriage, one potentially fraught with
tension, given the context, typical among the elite, of polygamy and
concubinage. The result of courtship, ‘affection’ (anura¯ga) was consid-
ered to be a ‘fruit’ of marriage (viva¯ha¯na¯m phalam) rather than mar-
riage being the culmination of courtship and affection.97
Indeed, if we follow the texts on ka¯ma, it is clear that the conjugal
relation formed only one of the potential contexts—and perhaps not
the preferred one—for courtship. After recommending the norm of
same-caste liaisons with unmarried virgins for the purpose of pro-
creation, Va¯tsya¯yana says that relations with lower varn. as not fully
rejected from the social order, courtesans, and widows or women once
married, being neither forbidden nor commended by the s´a¯stras, may
be entered into for pleasure (sukha¯rthtva¯t).98 On this basis, Va¯tsya¯yana
concludes that na¯yika¯s were of three basic varieties—unmarried
maidens (kanya¯), women once married who seek again the company of
a man out of wedlock (punarbhu¯), and courtesans (ves´ya¯).99 Excepting
virgins of the same caste married for children, other women of these
categories were to be enjoyed for pleasure alone.
Judging from subha¯s.ita literature, for many men of rank the cour-
tesan was the preferred liaison. Relations with courtesans (gan. ika¯),
the highest rank of prostitute, entailed elaborate courtship, explicitly
detailed in the Ka¯masu¯tra and the theme of numerous literary works,
including an entire genre, the bha¯n. a monologue play. Many aphor-
isms compare the courtesan favourably with the wife: in contrast to
courtesans, according to one saying, wives had the uninterrupted
course of their youths destroyed by continually having children, had
no respect for the games, diversions, and sentiments of the salon of
95 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.2.43–4; repeated Ratirahasya 11.21–2.
96 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.2.41; repeated, with slight variance, in Ratirahasya 11.20.
97 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.5.30.
98 Ka¯masu¯tra 1.5.3.
99 Va¯tsya¯yana goes on to engage various contemporary authorities (no longer
extant) over the question of other categories of na¯yika¯s, implicitly conceding two
more varieties—the married woman enjoyed for some other purpose (paks.ikı¯), and
those of the ‘third nature, (tritı¯yaprakr.ti), classiﬁed as neither man nor woman. Ka¯ma-
su¯tra 1.5.5, 27. Varieties of tritı¯yaprakr.ti are discussed in more detail at Ka¯masu¯tra
2.9.1–8, in connection with the practice of auparis.t.akam.
COURTSH IP IN MED IEVAL IND IA 131
reﬁned men (gos.t.hı¯), avoided manners of the courtesan, and were
devoid of passion.100 Numerous sayings recommend that the perfect
wife strive to be like a prostitute in bed.101
Another context of courtship for men of rank, but particularly
princes, must have been the affections they received from palace
women as they reached maturity. Such episodes are mentioned in the
accounts of princely lives contained in the Buddhacarita, Raghuvam˙s´a,
andKa¯dambarı¯ and other texts. Though these descriptions are intended
to underscore the attractiveness of the young prince, they also point to
an important context for sexual liaisons which were not structured by
the interests of marriage. Such episodes in the young prince’s life, S´a¯k-
yamuni’s case only being an extreme example, were meant to demon-
strate his ability to master his senses and remain ultimately aloof from
these attachments. King Agnivarn. a of the Raghuvam˙s´a, whose sad fate
was mentioned above, begins his life of pleasure in his youth at the
palace, and never emerges from it. These episodes point to an import-
ant dimension of courtship in the life of the court which we shall be
exploring in the remainder of this essay. Courtship introduced young
men to some of the most important ‘lessons’ and ‘rules’ of courtly life
as a whole. It formed a perfect ‘training ground’ for the virtuous. After
learning the sciences, young princes were ‘tested’ in the company of
women before they assumed the throne. In courtship they were to per-
fect the controlled display and interpretation of dispositions, exhibit
courtesy, generosity and other virtues, and most importantly, exercise
self-mastery at all times.
Whatever the context of courtship, there is a tendency in its rep-
resentation, in both the texts on poetics and the poetry itself, to
dissociate lovers from their contexts. We tend to ﬁnd a world of
hermetically sealed lovers who solicit (pra¯rthana), create conﬁdence
(visram. bhanam) and win over (jayan) one another through various stra-
tegems. The context of the courtly world, however, may be dimly
discerned by attention to the dynamics of lovers themselves. It will
be suggested here that the ubiquitous representation of this theme
in courtly poetry may thus be understood in a new light, as a tableau
onto which courtly society projected its larger concerns and anxieties,
particularly those around the problems of autonomy and dependence
100 Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 28. Judging from the sources, the institution of marriage
formed no bar in their relations with them. One need only think of S´u¯draka’s
famous play, the Mr.cchakat.ika, where the hero, the brahmin Ca¯rudatta, falls in love
with the courtesan Vasantasena¯.
101 Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 18–21.
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which we have outlined above. The prominence of erotics in the liter-
ature of the courts of medieval India has much to do with the fact
that ‘courtship’ became the arena where the ethical problems of
courtly life were reﬂected upon and learned through the ‘game of
love’. From this vantage point, the rise of the dominance of this
theme in courtly poetry is quite clearly related to and explicable by
the spread of ‘feudal’ ties of dependence in medieval India.
The link between erotics and the wider problems of courtly life as
sketched in previous sections of this essay is in the ﬁrst place under-
scored by the fact that a number of the key terms used in this discus-
sion—anura¯ga, vas´a, mano grah—are usually encountered ﬁrst by
modern scholars of Sanskrit literature not to describe political, but
instead erotic relationships. This congruence of language deserves
serious consideration, for the agonism of affection is even more
apparent in the discourses on courtly love. Perhaps the most obvious
parallel is the explicit martialization of courtship. This takes numer-
ous forms. The most common images connect the bodies and ges-
tures of lovers to weaponry in general, as when Bhartr.hari says that
a woman’s sidelong looks, darting glances with raised eyebrows, soft
speech, shy laughter, and playfully indolent movement all constitute
at once their ornaments (bhu¯s.an.am) and their weapons (ayudham).102
More particular is the iconography of Ka¯madeva, the bowman of
love, who pierces the hearts of lovers with his ﬂower arrows. This set
of comparisons forms among the most popular images of courtly
ka¯vya. The most developed imagery is resolved around the eye, with
the eyebrow compared to the bow, the eyelash to the bowstring and
the glance to the arrow. In a typical example from Vidya¯kara’s
anthology, the female’s glance (vı¯ks.itam) is likened to a poison arrow,
bringing paralysis, dizziness of mind, fever, and in the last event, loss
of consciousness following Va¯stya¯yana’s stations of desire.103 Desire
in Sanskrit erotics was considered to be afﬂictive, not simply as a
generalization of the self ’s relation to the world (as it has been read
by scholars of religion), but more speciﬁcally as violence of one
person against another. Once again, a hymn from the Atharvaveda
makes this explicit. To gain success in love, one could perform a rite
incanting ‘with that arrow, winged with longing (adhı¯parn. a¯m), whose
shaft is love (ka¯mas´alyam), whose neck is resolve (sam. kalpakulmala¯m)—
102 Subha¯s.itatris´atı¯ 2.3.
103 Vidya¯kara, Subha¯s.itaratnakos´a ed. D. D. Kosambi and V. V. Gokhale
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), 496.
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with that Ka¯ma, well aimed, I shall pierce your heart.’104 Va¯tsya¯yana
remarks that erotic pleasure takes the form of a combat
(kalaharu¯pam) because it is essentially a contest (viva¯da¯tmakatva¯d) and
because of its contrariety (va¯mas´ı¯latva¯t), which his commentator
Yas´odhara explains as arising ‘because man and woman each tries to
accomplish their own goal (sva¯rthasiddhaye) by overcoming the other
(paraspara¯bhibhavena).’105
The Ka¯masu¯tra makes it clear that the goal of this combat was
gaining the attachment of one’s opponent. Creating conﬁdence and
trust (visrambhanam, vis´va¯sa) and soliciting (pra¯rthana) were all
embraced within the larger strategy of ‘winning over’ a lover to one-
self, or what Va¯tsya¯yana calls literally ‘causing one to be attached’
(anuran˜jayati).106 The idea was to gain the attachment of one’s par-
amour without oneself becoming attached. For men, according to the
Mr.cchakat.ika, ‘no attachment (ra¯ga) should be had to women; women
insult the attached man (raktam purus.am); only the woman who is
herself attached (raktaiva) should be enjoyed.’107 In preparing for
courtship, the idea was to make oneself ‘attractive’; the suitable
na¯yaka, just like the king, was to possess qualities which were abhiga-
mya, ‘inviting’, and caused others to move toward him.108 The cour-
tesan Vasantasena¯ repeatedly remarks in the Mr.cchakat.ika that she
is attached to virtues (gunes.vanurakta) of Ca¯rudatta.109
The drawing of a lover to oneself, just as drawing a dependant,
and gaining his or her attachment, was fraught with potential antag-
onism. Each lover tried to ‘catch’ the mind of the other, and having
done so, to exercise ‘control’ or ‘inﬂuence’ (vas´a) over it. Typical are
two ninth-century grafﬁti inscriptions from Sigiriya in Sri Lanka
addressed to paintings of heavenly maidens: ‘Having looked at you
my mind is as if subdued (visı¯); by the mere sight of you I am
enslaved’; You have bent and subdued (visı¯) my mind.’110 Wives were
recommended to seek control over their husbands, particularly in
104 Atharvaveda 3.25.2.
105 Ka¯masu¯tra 2.7.1 and comm. The description of lovers bears resemblance to the
well-known deﬁnition of an enemy in the texts on polity. The enemy, according to
Ka¯mandakı¯, was one who pursued the same goal as the self (eka¯rtha¯bhinives´a), Nı¯tisa¯ra
8.14.
106 Ka¯masu¯tra 3.3.2.
107 Mr.cchakat.ika 4.14.
108 Ka¯masu¯tra 6.1.11.
109 Mr.cchakat.ika 1.6 passim.
110 Sinhala visı¯ = Sanskrit vas´a. Sigiriya Grafﬁti, nos 273, 166. See also nos 211,
494, 547.
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the polygamous context. Va¯tsya¯yana says that a king or minister’s
daughter who knows the sixty-four arts will control her husband
(svavas´e kurute patim) even if there are a thousand other women in
the inner quarters (antah.puram).111 Exercising control over one’s hus-
band also entailed mastering the other women of the household, and
Va¯tsya¯yana advises the young wife to conquer her own anger and
cultivate herself in accord with the ka¯mas´a¯stra in order to stand above
(adhitis.t.hati) and control (karoti vas´yam) her co-wives and her hus-
band.112 Conversely, the na¯yaka was also encouraged to bring a
woman under his control. In his disquisition before the gos.t.hı¯, the
vit.a Devilaka is asked the question of how one can bring under one’s
control (vas´ya¯) a woman who does not disclose any sign of desire
(ka¯malin˙ga), who says ‘enough’, who does not draw near, and avoids
one at the proper time. The vit.a approves of this question, and
responds that one must ﬁrst know the nature of the woman and then
adopt a suitable means accordingly.113 When a man could not achieve
this through the normal methods recommended in the ka¯mas´a¯stra, he
could have recourse to ‘covert methods’ (aupanis.adikam) which
included the use of various special substances (dravya) and rites from
the Atharvaveda. The goal of many of the aphrodisiacal recipes was to
enable a man to ‘exert inﬂuence’ (vas´ikaran. am) over a woman.114 The
signiﬁcant aspect of these formulae for the purpose at hand is not
their ‘secrecy’, but quite the opposite, their open revelation as to the
ambitions and strategies of courtship as a whole.
The Courtesan as Icon
The ﬁgure of the courtesan in the discourses of the court is worth
pausing over, as among the non-conjugal sexual relations permitted
by the s´a¯stras for man of rank, the courtesan formed the most
reﬂected upon in the didactic literature. It would seem that the cour-
111 Ka¯masu¯tra 1.3.22. See also Na¯t.yas´a¯stra 24.224 for the woman whose husband
is under her control (sva¯dhı¯nabhartr.ka¯).
112 Ka¯masu¯tra 4.2.90.
113 Dhu¯rtavit.asam. va¯da 46+. Devilaka recommends forcible seizure in the case of a
proud woman.
114 Ka¯masu¯tra 7.12–3 ff.; 25–28; 31–35. The whole of the fourteenth book of the
Ratirahasya is devoted to vas´ı¯karan. am, as well as speciﬁc mantras for various types of
women in the sections on na¯yikabheda. See Ratirahasya 1.23+; 14.1 ff. Also s.v. in Ram
Kumar Rai in his Encyclopedia of Indian Erotics (Varanasi Prachya Prakashan, 1983)
which draws heavily on Kalya¯namalla’s late-ﬁfteenth century Anan˙garan˙ga.
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tesan was the na¯yika¯ par excellence for those at court.115 The cour-
tesan is peculiar in that though inferior in rank to the wives and
maidens of upper caste men, she at the same time could largely
operate as an autonomous agent at court, unattached to the juridical
identity of any male. She was capable of gaining the attachments of
men and these attachments could in some cases have notorious and
weighty consequences. Courtesans sought to make their own way in
courtly circles through the exercise of very real capacities amongst
these afﬁliations. At one level, the courtesan differed little in the
kinds of capacities she possessed from the various men who sur-
rounded her (though the breadth of her capacities were considerably
restricted). The discourse on courtesans is important because while
they are often decried as being inferior to women of good standing,
numerous aphorisms make the point that the courtesan was merely
a sub-species of women as a whole, particularly women of the court.
Courtesans are said to be better than women of good birth (kulastrı¯),
who are rarely chaste.116 Here the defamation of the courtesan con-
nects up with a wider denigration of women as ‘ﬁckle’ and ‘danger-
ous’.117 And given what we know from Va¯tsya¯yana’s account of
women enjoyed for pleasure outside of marriage, and the potential
motives and dangers of such liaisons, we can easily see the basis for
such perceptions.
In Va¯tsya¯yana’s list of qualiﬁcations for a male lover or na¯yaka, it
is noted that he should be of ‘independent means’ (svatantravr.tti), he
should not be subjected to women (na a¯sa¯m vas´aga), and, ﬁnally, he
should be unattached (anavasan˙kı¯).118 The courtesan is advised by
Va¯tsya¯yana to put an end to all three of these conditions. Va¯tsya¯yana
repeatedly says that the courtesan was to cause attraction
(anuran˜jayet) and attachment (sakta), even excessive attachment
(atisakta) in her lover and thus bring him under her will (vas´a).119 She
was then, through various means, to extract as much wealth as pos-
sible from him. The courtesan, by draining her paramour of his
wealth, destroyed his ﬁnancial independence and brought him under
115 It is only in his book on courtesans that Va¯tsya¯yana lays out the general char-
acteristics of the na¯yika¯ and na¯yaka.
116 Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 603–4.
117 The bad qualities of the courtesan are often considered indistinct from those
of women in general, who are seen as the larger species to which they belong. See
Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 243–4, 359–416, 514–17, 525, et al..
118 Ka¯masu¯tra 6.1.12.
119 See for example Ka¯masu¯tra 6.4.43.
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the control of others through debt and penury—she turned him from
a na¯yaka to, in the worst cases, a vit.a. Bereft of his independence, the
paramour was then summarily dismissed.
The chief means of gaining the attraction of her customer, accord-
ing to Va¯tsya¯yana, was dissemblance. Va¯tsya¯yana suggests that cour-
tesans go to men partly for pleasure, but more importantly for liveli-
hood, which requires them to make their affections seem natural
(svabha¯vika).120 She was to give her customer the impression that she
was attached to him in order to gain his attachment to her.121 One of
the most notable features of the aphoristic literature on courtesans is
its obsession with their deception. Some maintained, of course, that
her affections were genuine, most notably her faithful agent, the vit.a.
In one play a vit.a named Devilaka resolves a controversy at a salon
(gos.t.hı¯) regarding the methods of detecting a courtesan’s sincerity.122
Devilaka is adamant that the sentiments of courtesans were genuine,
as they were manifested by physical states on their bodies. These
physical states—horripilation, crying, sweating—were deemed invol-
untary bodily effects in the texts on dramaturgy. But courtesans,
others maintained, were just like actors and could induce these
states in their bodies.123 Indeed, the courtesan was an expert, accord-
ing to Da¯modaragupta, at theatrical presentation (abhinaya) which
in her case took the form of praiseworthy speech (stu¯ti), gesturing
with her limbs (ga¯trabhan˙ga), decoration (vinya¯sa) and indignation
(ma¯na).124
The courtesan was an expert in displaying desire in different ways.
Her agent, the vit.a explains to the members of the salon that femin-
ine desire (ka¯mitam) could be classiﬁed as either ‘open’ (praka¯s´a) or
‘concealed’ (pracchanna).125 Wives (kulavadhu¯) concealed their desires,
while courtesans (ves´yavadhu¯) could either openly display or hide their
affections. Anticipating the question of why the courtesan’s expres-
120 Ka¯masu¯tra 6.1.1–3. Much of Va¯tsya¯yana’s subsequent advice to courtesans is
aimed towards creating conﬁdence in her lover.
121 Ka¯masu¯tra 6.2.2.
122 See Dhu¯rtavit.asan
. va¯da 31, 32, 43.
123 Kut.t.anı¯mata 312, cited in Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 219. See also Kut.t.anı¯mata 98 and
Dhu¯rtavit.asam. va¯da 31–2. For other references to courtesans as actresses, see
Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 222–9.
124 Kut.t.anı¯mata 657, cited in Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 210. These attributes correspond
to the four modes of theatrical conveyance—va¯cika, a¯n˙gika, a¯ha¯rya and sa¯ttvika—as
set out in Na¯t. yas´a¯stra 6.23. See the commentary on Kut.t.anı¯mata 657 which cites the
Sa¯hityadarpana.
125 Dhu¯rtavit.asan
. va¯da 53+.
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sion of passions, which after all was permissible, would be concealed,
the vit.a continues that various types of men—men adored previously
(pu¯rvasam. stu¯ta), favourites of the king (ra¯javallabha), those who have
done some good for them (kr.topaka¯ra) or were gentle (anr.s´am. sa) and
devoted (bhaktima¯n) to them, or who showed respect to their
madames (ves´yajananı¯sevaka)—had to be served for her own interests
even if she did not seek them out. In such cases the open display of
affection was ‘feigned’ (kr.taka). But when a courtesan sought the
favours of a man secretly he had obtained the rarest reward of his
life, for this was a true reﬂection of her desires: ‘concealed love,
growing out of attachment (anura¯ga) alone, and having little fault
(alpados.a), is pleasing indeed in the case of courtesans’. Of course,
Devilaka’s optimism here is undermined by the elaboration in the
erotic manuals of ever greater forms of dissemblance on the part of
the courtesan.
The perennial debate about the authenticity of the courtesan is
signiﬁcant in light of the foregoing discussion. It is curious that the
moralists of the court would decry the courtesan, as the typical
woman, as faithless and deceptive. The aphorisms constantly bemoan
how they attract, ensnare, and capture the minds of men, exert their
control over them, take their money and subject them to others. But
such behaviours were more than familiar to the men of the court, as
they were the very strategies open to them throughout their careers
in the society of the good. In her labours of dissemblance and calcula-
tions of disposition the courtesan differed little from other agents
at court. This is recognized in the occasional verses which compare
courtesans to men at court. The secret attentions that a courtesan
might show a man were thus comparable to the secret devotions that
the followers of an old king showed to princes to gain their favour
when the king was dying.126 Dependants and courtesans sell their
bodies and words to anyone who will grant them favours. When it is
said that ‘like bitches (s´unı¯va), courtesans will display hundreds of
sweet words, eat dirt, perform bad actions and live by deceit (kapat.a)
all for gifts (da¯nato)’,127 the author might equally be speaking of the
necessities of dependency. Indeed, according to the Mu¯drara¯ks.asa, the
courtier as one ‘dependent on another’ (parantatra) ‘sold his body
(s´arı¯ram vikrı¯ya) to the wealthy and lost all ability to discriminate.128
126 Ra¯jataran˙ginı¯ 7.619, as cited in Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 183. For other verses which
compare the courtesan to men of the court, see Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 462, 482, 484.
127 Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 619.
128 Mudrara¯ks.asa 5.4.
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Numerous maxims also compare the courtesan to the king, whose
policies were unpredictable, concealed, and notoriously,
dangerous.129
One obvious conclusion that may be drawn from this invective
against the courtesan and women in general in their role as na¯yika¯s
is that relations between lovers were often fraught with the same
complex tensions as those of lords and dependants. Indeed, this is
because at one level marriage, concubinage, and prostitution—the
institutions that governed such relations—were in fact hierarchical
relationships intimately associated with authority and property to
begin with, which overlapped and were largely continuous with those
which obtained between men. The contexts of courtship, in other
words, were the contexts of the court, and were governed by the
same principles and strategies.
This essay, however, has tried to suggest something more. Court-
ship had a special place in the world of the court, both as an institu-
tion and as an object of speculation and delectation. Courtship
during youth allowed the men of the court to learn the strategies of
conduct and forms of self-discipline necessary for their relations with
men at court. The discernment and deployment of deception and
indirection required in courtship prepared men for courtly existence
as a whole. In a world where discerning the strategies of others and
concealing one’s own was a necessity due to inbuilt antagonisms, the
process of courtship could provide no better training. And judging
from the sources, continued success at courtship was an indication
of one’s self-perfection as a powerful man at court. In this capacity,
the king had to represent himself as the most perfectly skilled player
in the contest of love. This was achieved by the various liaisons in
which he engaged, but extended to his relations with the feminine
qualities of sovereignty, which were sexualized in precisely this
manner. As one inscription describes a king, he was ‘freely chosen
by the goddess of fortune, her mind being overpowered by passion
for all his attractive royal qualities and other excellences’.130
The conﬂictual elements in the discourses of courtship reveal the
greater anxieties of courtly society around autonomy and depend-
ence. It is not complete detachment from the world typical of the
ascetic ideals which underlies the courtly discourses, but rather the
129 Gan. ika¯vr.ttasan˙graha 436–8; also 529–36, 541.
130 sakala¯bhiga¯mika¯digun. a¯nura¯ganirbbharamanasa¯ svayam vr.to ra¯jalaks.mya¯: an eighth-
century Gurjara inscription. Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum 4 (1955), no. 24, p. 105.
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idea of a hierarchical form of social engagement in which one sub-
jected others by gaining their ‘attachment’ but remained relatively
detached oneself. This was the underlying dynamic between lord and
retainer which structured the affectations of courtly ethics. The
problem, of course, was that each agent was typically caught in a
web of such ‘attachments’. Erotic love in part formed the palette
upon which the underlying agonism entailed in relations of depend-
ence and autonomy, wealth and poverty, service and mastery, was
continually projected and thought about. Conversely, the particular-
ities of this agonism, so essential to the representation of love in
Sanskrit literature, may explain the prominence of this discourse as
a whole at the courts of medieval India more than any civilizational
conﬂict between the immanent and the transcendent.

